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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 9189 
CARL MACK COURTNEY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent is, in essential agreement with appellant's 
statement. However, the following facts should be men-
tioned. As to the matter of the "clicking" of the gun (T. 
64 toT. 67) the expert said he didn't know about a click-
ing sound. (T. 64). At T. 65 the Court mentions a slight 
clicking sound. A demonstration of slight clicking occurs 
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at T. 66. While Irwin was not completely clear as to 
whether the gun was pointed at_ his stomach at the time 
of the shot, he did emphasize that the appellant's head and 
arm were pointed at him. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE 
DEFENDANT AND ITS JUDGMENT WAS 
PROPERLY RENDERED. 
POINT II. 
AN INSTRUCTION AS TO INCLUDED OFFENS-
ES NEED NOT HAVE BEEN GIVEN AS A 
MATTER OF LAW IN THE ABSENCE OF A 
REQUEST BY DEFENDANT. 
POINT III. 
THE VERDICT WAS BASED ON PROPER 
EVIDgNCE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE 
DEFENDANT AND ITS JUDGMENT WAS 
PROPERLY RENDERED. 
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Appellant has set out the text of Sections 77-21-6 and 
77-21-8, U.C.A. 1953, and relies greatly on them. As far 
as the two sections are pertinent, they read as follows: 
77-21-6. "The information may be in substantially 
the following form * * * " 
77-21-8. "(2) The information or indictment may 
refer to a section or subsection of any statute cre-
ating the offense charged therein * * * ." 
Clearly the two statutes, by use of the term "may" 
are made directory and pennissive rather than manda-
tory. Otherwise the term "shall" would have been used 
Subsection (1) of Section 77-21-8 states: 
"(1) The information or indictment may charge·, 
and is valid and sufficient if it charges the offense 
for which the defendant is being prosecuted in one 
or more of the following ways: 
(a) By using the name given to the offense by the 
common law by a statute. 
(b) By stating so much of the definition of the of-
fense, either in terms of the common law or of the 
statute defining the offense or in terms of substan-
tially the same meaning, as is sufficient to give the 
court and the defendant notice of what offense is 
intended to be charged." 
Respondent believes that the information used in this 
case fully complies with both paragraphs (a) and (b). The 
information uses the words " * * * assaulted Gorman W. 
Irwin with a deadly weapon * * * ." 
This wording is extremely close to the language in the 
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heading of Section 76-7-6 which defines the offense. The 
information also, in words of substantially the same mean-
ing, gives enough of the definition of the crime to provide 
notice of the offense intended to be charged. 
In the case of People v. Hill, 3 Utah 334, 3 Pac. 75, the 
Court stated: 
" * * *It would appear to be sufficient if the charge 
be stated with so much certainty that defendant 
may know what he is called upon to answer, and 
the court how to render judgment. In other words, 
substantial justice should be more sought after 
than artificial nicety." 
It would be absurd to assume that appellant was, or pos-
sibly could have been, being properly represented by ex-
perienced counsel, in doubt as to the fact that the acts al-
leged, if true, constituted a crime against the State of 
Utah, and not, as suggested in appellant's brief, page 12, 
a crime against religion, nature, morals, or ethics. 
Furthermore, if appellant was mystified over the 
nature of the charge he was at perfect liberty to request 
a bill of particulars as provided by the terms of Section 
77-21-9, U.C.A. 1953, a right the defendant must be given 
on demand and· one not discretionary with the Court. State 
v. Solomon, 93 Utah 70, 71 P.2d 104. 
Moreover, appellant could have made, but did not 
make, a motion to quash the information. This could have 
been done up to the time of his entering his plea thereto. 
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It is clear, therefore, that (1) the crime was properly 
charged; (2) appellant was properly apprised of the crime 
charged; (3) appellant could have requested and received 
a bill of particulars but failed to do so; (4) appellant could 
have moved to quash the information, but failed to do so 
and thus waived his objections to it. 
Since the information was in all respects proper, and 
since appellant did not call any supposed error to the at-
tention of the Court, the allegations of his first point must 
now be disregarded. 
POINT II. 
AN INSTRUCTION AS TO INCLUDED OFFENS-
ES NEED NOT HAVE BEEN GIVEN AS A 
MATTER OF LAW IN THE ABSENCE OF A 
REQUEST BY DEFENDANT. 
Appellant is not entitled to a reversal of his conviction 
on the ground that no instruction was given as to lesser 
offenses included within the crime of assault with a deadly 
weapon. 
The early Utah case, State v. McCurtain, 52 Utah 63, 
172 Pac. 481, laid down the general rule that " * * * If 
counsel desire to have the court charge upon a particular 
phase of the case, or upon a collateral issue * * *, they 
must offer a proper request and if it is refused save an ex-
ception. Without this the question may not be reviewed." 
The Utah case of State v. Sullivan, 73 Utah 582, 276 
Pac. 166, mentioned by appellant, contains the following 
language: 
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"Moreover, the great weight of authority is that, 
before a defendant can be heard to complain be-
cause the trial court did not instruct upon the law 
of lesser offenses included within the crime 
charged, such defendant must have requested in-
struction upon the included offense or offenses." 
The Court then sets out the citations of 27 cases support-
ing this view, including those from Idaho, Colorado and 
California courts. 
The Court then continues: 
"Similar views have been expressed by this Court. 
People v. Robinson, 6 Utah 101, 21 Pac. 403; State 
v. McCurtain, 52, Utah 63, 172 Pac. 481. In the case 
of People v. Robinson, a distinction is made be-
tween a case where there are different degrees of 
the offense charged and a case where there may 
be a lesser offense included within the crime 
charged." 
The Sullivan case still appears to be the law in Utah de-
spite the existence of Section 77-31-5, U.C.A. 1953, cited 
at appellant's brief, page 19. 
Appellant relies strongly on State v. Barkas, 91 Utah 
574, 65 P.2d 1130. There, however, the instruction was 
requested by defendant but denied by the Court. There 
is a vast difference between the right to have a certain in-
strution given when you ask for it, and to have it given 
even though you don't ask for it, as in this case. 
The courts cannot properly be deemed in reversible 
error by the failure of criminal defendants, either pur-
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posely or inadvertently, to ask for instructions as to in-
cluded offenses. 
Appellant waived his right to such an instruction by 
his failure to make the request, and his second point is 
without merit. 
POINT III. 
THE VERDICT WAS BASED ON PROPER EVIDENCE .. 
The jury had evidence before it sufficient to support 
a verdict of guilty. 
At page 21 of his brief, appellant says that the prose-
cuting witness provoked a fight with the defendant. This 
is not true, since appellant recklessly drove his car in 
such a fashion as to throw oily gravel all over the wind-
shield of Irwin's car. (T'. 4, T. 37). 
While the prosecuting witness admits, using crude 
language on appellant in his anger over having his car 
splattered, even so he had neither the present intention nor 
the ability to start a fight as long as appellant remained 
in his car. Nor are words alone sufficient provocation. 
As to his intention, Irwin testified (T. 4): 
" * * * If he did that again I would punch him in 
the nose." 
By clear infeTence the intention expressed by this state-
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ment insured that if appellant did not do the act again 
he would not be punched in the nose. 
Appellant, therefore, had the full power to avoid any 
serious altercation of any kind. But this he did not choose 
to do. In his anger he continued for a short distance up 
the road, then pulled his car to the side of the highway, 
(T. 6, T. 38), stopped and parked it and got out of his car 
with a pistol in one hand and a beer bottle in the other, 
(T. 38). One can scarcely imagine an act more clearly in-
dicative of an intention to commit bodily harm. Followed 
by the shooting, this clearly constituted the commission 
of an assault with a deadly weapon. 
In view of the rather modest provocation provided 
by Irwin in response to the gravel incident and the present 
and complete ability of appellant to avoid any further 
difficulty whatsoever, it is obvious that appellant's acts 
were done without just cause or excuse and with no con-
siderable provocation, thus bringing him fully within the 
requirements of the statute establishing the crime of as-
sault with a deadly weapon. 
The evidence clearly showed that appellant pointed 
his pistol in the direction of the prosecuting witness, 
pulled the trigger four times, even though, because of 
mechanical failure, successfully firing it only once. (T. 9, 
T. 18). Fortunately, Irwin was not hit, but this was due 
only to the poor marksmanship of appellant and not any 
kindly intentions in his heart. This is further suggested 
by the fact that when the gun failed to respond, appellant 
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began swinging violently at Irwin with his beer bottle. 
(T. 7, T. 8). 
The Court is reluctant to substitute its judgment for 
that of the trial jury. The jury here was properly instruct-
ed in every particular and evidently it concluded that 
appellant had initiated the fight, that he did not act in 
self defense, and that he committed the assault without 
just cause or excuse. 
Every necessary element of the crime of assault with 
a deadly weapon is present in the facts proved and there-
fore appellant's point three cannot be sustained. 
CONCLUSION 
For reasons set forth above the appeal of Carl Mack 
Courtney should be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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